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Movement, Embodiment, Emotion
David Freedberg
1 For a long time, both anthropology and the history of art neglected issues of emotion
and  embodiment.  Now  these  subjects  have  become  all  too  fashionable.  The
phenomenological  involvement  of  beholder  and  investigator  in  the  objects  of
observation,  whether  pictures  or  people,  has  come  to  be  taken  for  granted.
Disembodied analytic detachment, once the most favored of investigative strategies,
has come to be seen as a hindrance and a disadvantage. The study of motion, or rather,
the perception of  bodies in motion,  has also gained increasing attention.  This  is  to
acknowledge the many names I will have to omit, not just because of lack of time, but
as a consequence of the proliferation of research and discussion in areas in which we
think we’re being original, and of the loss of work from the pre-Google era, work that
precedes modernity and contemporaneity and yet always has something relevant to
what we do now. Indeed, in what I have to say today, there is much that is pertinent not
only in Merleau-Ponty (most obviously of all), but also in the great nineteenth-century
empathy theorists, Visscher, Lipps, and even that eventually most reactionary of art
historians, Heinrich Wölfflin. I speak not of the oldness of the past, but its newness, its
topicality, its always prophetic possibilities. 
2 It  would  be  superfluous  to  mention  the  differences  between  anthropology  and  art
history; most of us know what they are. In fact, the fields can be said to be rapidly
merging. Instead of simply concentrating on high art, all self-respecting art historians
now  pay  attention  to  the  full  range  of  visual  images  in  different  cultures;
anthropologists have long attended to the esthetic aspects of images and to esthetic
rankings within cultures. All this has been salutary and has led to the kinds of discourse
we initiate today. The organizers’ original idea was for me to talk about a subject that is
more  or  less  untranslatable  into  English,  namely,  “L’oeuvre  de  l’art  a  l’épreuve  de
l’histoire et de l’anthropologie,” and I take it that the question remains: how much can
art be reclaimed at a time when the history of art is so often alleged to have come to an
end, and when the distinctions between art and non-art have come to be more fluid
than ever? 
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3 So what remains to be done? We need to see how we, both as anthropologists and art
historians,  can be  open to  other  disciplines,  so  that  we can profit  from them,  and
embark on the project of understanding what contemporary artmaking entails, just as
the prospectus for this conference suggests. 
4 The  new studies  of  embodiment  and  emotion  which  I  am going  to  talk  about  this
morning  raise  an  even more  critical  problem of our  time,  namely  the  relationship
between the  cultural  construction  of  responses  and  those  aspects  of  response  that
pertain to our human nature. It is the old question of how culture modulates biology.
These are issues that were raised with some force from the mid-1980s on by writers like
Tim Ingold, Margot Lyon,1 Catherine Lutz, John Leavitt2 and many others. But the great
challenge for our new age, I think, is to reconcile the local and the particular with the
general and the automatic.  It  is  to come to terms with the claims of anthropology,
predicated  as  it  is  on  difference—in  this  sense  we  are  all  anthropologists  now,
especially (not occasionally) art historians—and of cognitive neuroscience, predicated
as it is, for the most part, on the general. We students of human behaviors have for too
long simply dismissed this important dialectic. To speak of automaticity is to speak of
the human condition, to speak of responses that are predicated not so much on the
particular, but on the neural substrate of human behavior and feeling that subtend the
particular. What I have to say today will depend as much on Visscher, therefore, as on
Ramon y Cajal. 
5 We are all familiar with one or another form of embodied engagement with the image
or the work before us, with the faces or represented bodies within it, or simply with the
sheer scale and weight of the object. But it need not even have a body to elicit such
phenomenological  responses;  it  can simply be the weight and sheer scale that calls
forth a sense of our bodies and seems to constrain them. Take the obvious case of the
sculptures of Richard Serra. To look at one of his sculptures is to be physically involved
with  it.  The  sheer  scale  and  proximity  of  the  over-lifesized  walls  fosters  intense
awareness of the insubstantiality and fragility of the body. In our bones we feel a sense
of scale and weight and a pressure to move around or within them. The sculptures
command attention because they involve our bodies. But more than this. To see the
great curves of his works, works like the Torqued Ellipses, or Sequence, or many others,
the  walls  that  seem  to  descend  on  us  and  to  close  in  on  us,  is  to  feel  a  sense  of
movement within ourselves, when we look at them from the outside, or from above, or
to be drawn ineluctably in, as we find ourselves forced to move along with and within
them. 
6 But there is another form of embodied response that is critical to our understanding of
the relations between visual representations and motor responses. It can also extend,
as Vittorio Gallese and I have recently shown, to the beholder’s corporeal sense of the
artisan’s  movement behind the mark,  indeed the action itself,  the creative work in
other words, behind the mark. We are now in a position to plot the cortical motoric
responses  to  the  movements  of  the  hand  implied  by  calligraphy,  to  the  implicit
movements behind the great strokes of the pen in works such as these,  and to the
large-scale torchdrawn ideograms by Qui Zhije. 
7 Today I want to talk about the sense of movement that ensues from vision, and the
emotions that ensue upon movement—hence, by the way, my current concern with
dance in culture, and dance in and as representation. Movement lies at the basis of our
phenomenological and empathetic understanding of culture, images and works of art.
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Specific claims about the role of movement in such understanding have been made
many times before—one needs only to think of the work of Aby Warburg, and of recent
commentaries  on  it  such as  those  by  Philippe  Alain  Michaud  and  Georges  Didi
Huberman—but what I want to suggest today is that the perception of movement—even
implied  movement—is  fundamental  to  our  understanding  of  the  other  and  the
represented other. Such perception may be cultural and it may be automatic. I should
add here that when I speak of automatic perceptions I mean perceptions uninformed
by cognition (in other words I take a view of perception that is not the common one). In
order to fully understand the mechanisms of our direct grasp of action, movement,
embodiment and emotion, we need to pay heed to a discipline that lies beyond the
traditional boundaries of the humanities and the social sciences—the neuroscience of
movement and action. This is the field that allows us to plot the neural substrate of
imitation and the imitative basis of action understanding. In the framework of what
Gallese has correctly called embodied simulation, imitation thus acquires a dimension
beyond its usual art historical and anthropological meaning. 
8 Four closely interrelated domains stand at the conjunction of art and anthropology, of
the history of art and the present practice of art. First of all: work and the processes of
work;  secondly,  and  most  importantly,  the  physical  dimension  of  this  work,  the
corporeality of production in the widest sense; thirdly, the felt emulation and imitation
of  movement;  and  fourthly  the  emotional  freight  of  movement,  both  of  actual
execution of movement and of sight of movement. We might even hypothesize that all
felt emulation of movement entails the generation of emotion; we will return to this
later. Valuable work has been on the role of embodiment in the analysis of work and
culture by writers such as Michael  Jackson,  Thomas Csordas,  Carlo Severi,  and Tim
Ingold; Howard Morphy, in his nice essay on the Yolngu, made a compelling case for
the inclusion of  both the senses  and the emotions in  any consideration of  esthetic
effect;  and Alfred Gell  made clear his impatience with intellectualizing views of art
(such as those of Arthur Danto). But I think it is possible to go still further. 
9 Consider these images of soccer players. I take them from the magnificent exhibition of
soccer photos held in Berlin in 2006. To look at images such as these is to feel a form of
emulative movement in our bones, or rather in our own muscles. So clear is this effect
that  even  the  Chilean  rightback  raises  his  arms  in  almost  perfect  imitation  of  the
English forward in front of him during the 1950 World Cup in Rio.3 When we look at
images such as this, we feel our own muscles activated in the same ways as those of the
players,  even though we know we cannot jump so high.  We feel  the energy in our
bones, and some of the vigorous awkwardness of the players in this photograph of the
Spanish final of 1982; or we open our mouths and rush forward in triumph, a feeling
intensified when we notice the prostate player on the left, his hands covering his eyes
in a gesture of despair which we also understand on an empathetic motoric level. This
is a gesture which wells up in us, just as that determined run, that open mouth evokes a
similar sense of triumph in ourselves. We feel both the movements of the players and,
significantly, all the more their excitements and despondencies. Images such as these
make  all  too  clear  the  possible  roles  of  felt  imitation  in  our  understanding  of  the
movement of others. We feel the tensions, the excitements, the muscular contractions,
and, for the most part, all the emotions that ensue upon such movements, as Barthes
set out so eloquently in his famous essay on Wrestling. To say “we,” I believe, is not
simply to take a culture-centric view of emotion, or of response to bodily movement, as
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Lutz  and  Abu-Lugod  claimed  some  years  ago  in  their  insistence  on  the  cultural
construction and politicization of emotional responses. 
10 Such reactions also account, for example, for the popular appeal of wrestling matches—
though no one would claim that wrestlers’ movements have the grace of those of soccer
players; but when they do they too reach the status of art. To understand this, however,
requires  more  than  the  simple  sociology  of  wrestling  (as,  for  example,  in  Alter’s
interesting book on wrestling practices in India). To properly grasp wrestling’s cultural
expressions  one  also  needs  an  adequate  theory  of  the  relations  between  the
constitution  of  a  culture  in  particular  and  the  constitution  of  the  human  body  in
general; one needs to know the mechanisms of its potential for action understanding,
for acting and reacting in the presence of the bodily movements of others. Such an
approach  will  help  us  understand  not  only  the  physical  basis  of  the  connections
between sport and art, but also the multifold varieties of body art, and the intersection
of anthropology and art in performances such as, say, those of the members of the
Gutai group in Japan. 
11 But what really does sport have to do with art? The athletic grace of the sportsman, his
finely and intelligently executed moves, may well be equivalent to whatever it is we
choose to call art. 
12 In his essay entitled “What is art”, the great Trinidadian writer C. L. R. James took the
game of  cricket  as  his  central  example;  and  he  concluded  his  discussion  with  this
remarkable  claim:  “we  someday  may  be  able  to  answer  Tolstoy’s  exasperated  and
exasperating question, what is art . . . but only when we integrate our vision of Walcott
on the back foot through the covers with the outstretched arm of the Olympic Apollo.”
James takes the view that that cricket is an art because like all art it implicates the
viewer in the physical aspects of the game. And here the revolutionary draws on the
reactionary, by citing the views of Bernard Berenson on what it is that can make art
life-enhancing, as Berenson notoriously put it. He quotes Berenson’s famous passage on
Pollaiuolo’s Hercules and Antaeus, in which the art historian insists on the ways in which
spectators may feel in their own muscles the efforts represented in the works they
observe and give them an enhanced sense of their own muscular capacity, as a result of
the felt  activation of  the muscles they observe.  James made it  plain that  what was
critical in our understanding of art is precisely, as he put it, “the business of setting off
physical processes and evoking a sense of movement in the spectator.” This is what
joins sport with art, and it is the skill of the sportsman, or the artist, in setting off the
process of inward imitation—or of the possibility of imitation—that distinguishes the
superior sportsman or artist. 
13 But it is not only the felt imitation of actual movement that comes into play here, it is
also the imitation of the implied action of the artist, as in the case of Gutai art, or Lucio
Fontana, as we shall see in a moment. So how can we account more precisely for the
ways in which we seem to intuitively engage, in a felt corporeal way, with the actions,
work, pleasures and representations of others? 
14 It seems to me that the discovery of mirror neurons in the premotor cortex of the brain
—and especially in Brodmann’s area 44 in humans, in an area significantly overlapping
Broca’s  area—provides  significant  clues,  and helps  us  better  understand the shared
interests and common ground of anthropologists and art historians. To come to terms
with  these  new  ways  of  understanding  the  relationship  between  observation,
movement  and  emotion  does  not  seem  to  me  to  entail  a  lapse  into  scientific
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reductionism.  Mirror  neurons  were  first  discovered  in  monkeys,  but  then  mirror
networks were discovered in the human brain as well. They provide substantial and in
my  view  convincing  evidence  for  the  activation  of  the  premotor  cortex,  in  both
monkeys  and  humans,  upon  observation  of  the  actions  of  others.  The  very  same
neurons fire in our premotor cortex (the area of the brain that prepares our muscles
for movement) as if we were engaged in the same actions as the ones we observe, even
if  we  do  not  execute  those  actions  ourselves.  As  a  result  of  the  work  of  Giacomo
Rizzolatti and Vittorio Gallese, we now know what happens in the case of that most
fundamental  of  esthetic  and anthropological  responses,  what  I—along with Antonio
Damasio,  the  great  expert  on  the  corporeal  bases  of  emotion—have  called  “as-if”
responses, in other words, the ways in which we respond as if we were actively engaged
in the same action—or placed in the same situation—as others we observe,  without
actually engaging in the same actions ourselves, or without even being in the same
situation  or  location  ourselves.  To  a  significant  extent,  this  also  accounts  for  our
inclination to respond to scenes of things and of people, above all, as if they were real.
Mirror  neurons thus seem to lie  at  the basis  of  our  felt  imitative responses to  the
actions of observed others, as well as for what Gallese has called embodied simulation
and our understanding of the intentions and sufferings of others.
15 In other papers I have discussed the forms of empathy that ensue upon observation,
whether observation of a painting or observation of a subject. I’ve insisted that it is no
longer as difficult as philosophers once claimed to understand the pain of others. Such
understanding is always through the body, and often in terms of the movement of the
body. 
16 Remarkable  progress  has  been  made  in  cognitive  research  on  recognition  of  the
emotional responses of others. How does this happen? It happens (as we now know
most conclusively in the case of fear and disgust) on the basis of the activation of the
identical areas of the brain in the observer as those that underlie the emotions of the
observed. So, for example, when someone is disgusted, the main area of the brain that
responds is the right anterior insula; and when we observe someone who expresses
disgust or the representation of disgust, it is precisely our own right anterior insula
that is activated too. Although similar claims were made by Darwin in his Expression of
the Emotions in Animals and Man, and despite the remarkable work of Paul Ekman and
the discovery of the selectivity of the facial fusiform gyrus in the temporal lobe of the
brain for facial recognition, the current anthropological and art historical orthodoxy
remains that we cannot understand the emotional responses of others outside their (or
our) contexts. We are supposedly unable to understand the minds of others. But we
understand others via the forms of simulation, most of which are embodied, that I have
been  outlining.  The  situation  is  much  more  complex  than  the  conventional
contextualist  position  allows.  We,  who  play  no  role  in  the  cultures  concerned,
immediately invest faces such as these with particular emotions, while in the case of
the Inuit masks from Point Hope (Copenhagen), say, although we may not be able to
pinpoint the exact emotions involved, we can be sure that part of their force resides in
our bodily responses, perhaps even our felt buccal responses to masks such as these.
Part  of  their  effectiveness  resides  precisely  in  an  incipient  and  perhaps  as  yet
undefined emotional and corporeal response not just to the positions of the mouths
and eyes, but even to the great downward incisions that emphasize the downward tilt
of the mouth of the mask on the right; while the force of sickness masks such as this
Pende Mbuya mask depends at least partly on our intuition that this is a face whose
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distortions, which we somehow equivalently feel, too, express the torment of sickness.
To say this is not to take away from the esthetic aspects of the work; it is to better
understand their effectiveness.
17 Those downward incisions in  the Point  Hope mask are  significant,  because they so
powerfully  arouse  a  sense  of  implicit  movement  in  their  beholders,  a  form  of
movement which has clear esthetic implications. 
18 I hope that you can see that I am moving towards an esthetic understanding of objects
that, even when most functional, require a sense not only of context, but of the neural
substrate  of  human  engagement  with  movement  and  embodiment,  and  the  innate
potential for recognition of the emotions that may ensue from them.
19 Now take the case of damage to the body, even to the skin. The mirror researchers have
also discovered activation of the secondary somatosensory cortex in the case of the
observation of damage to the skin; so that it is now possible to understand the frisson
of horror in the relevant part of the body not only in the case of images of torture,
about which I’ve recently spoken, but also of Grunewald, Caravaggio, and Goya, as well
as the intuitive responses we may have to the initials of the Revolutionary United Front
scarified into the chest of this female child soldier from Sierra Leone, where the effect
is further strengthened by a sense of the bodily engagement in the actual production of
letters, where action understanding and language actually overlap. 
20 The fact that this image served as an invitation to an exhibition of photographs by
Candace  Scharsu,  points  to  the  typically  fragile  boundary  between  photographic
documentation of horror and the historical aesthetic that also emerges in the protest
images of Goya, images that have long offered some of the most telling exemplifications
of the narrow borderline between the realistic recording of violence and art; between
propaganda  and  art;  between  bodily  terror  and  art;  and  between  images  as  pure
emotional instrumentality and high aesthetics.  The history of  the representation of
martyrdoms  provides  an  over-sufficiency  of  examples  in  which  it  is  impossible  to
escape from the conclusion that movement, embodiment, and emotion are essential
bases of art. 
21 A  body  is  a  body  in  movement,  or,  even  when  immobile,  a  body  potentially  in
movement, capable of being activated, liberated from its bonds or even, when truly
dead, of being resurrected, as we know from countless images of the Dead Christ. It is
not surprising that one of the basic Catholic defenses of images is predicated on the
resurrection of the incarnate body of Christ. Images work only once they are activated,
once their potential for movement is acknowledged and released. This is fundamental
to the bodily sense with which we invest all images, even non-figurative ones. 
22 But  let  me draw your  attention  very  briefly  to  the  apt  image  on the  cover  of  the
excellent catalogue of Stéphane Breton’s exhibition Qu’est-ce qu’un corps? at the Musee
du Quai Branly. Its effectiveness depends not just on our felt reaction to the saw-like
row  of  jagged  teeth,  to  the  distended  eyes,  to  the  weight,  if  we  are  male,  of  the
downward pointing penis, to the implied movement of the scarified jagged-patterned
body  (it  is  interesting  to  reflect  on  the  physical  consequences  of  the  marvelous
representation of pubic hair, suggesting not just movement, but also a phallus dentatus,
a sign, as if we needed this renewed reminder, of the bisexuality implicit in all sexuality
); but perhaps its effectiveness depends first and foremost on the felt resonance of the
gesture of the arms. 
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23 There is a study to be written about the history and ethnography of this gesture—but it
is clear that its particular power, its recurrence as one of the great Pathosformeln of art,
does not simply derive from its conventionality. We know, of course, that it does not
convey a single kind of emotion. It is polyvalent and contextually dependent. But at the
same time it is not only that. Take Basquiat’s 1982 drawing, which uses many of the
devices the African artist used, from the dentate mouth to the distended corneas; but
here Basquiat adds hair standing on end, smoke emanating from the hands, and above
all those jagged wild strokes over the body and in the sun or halo over the figure’s
head. It is an image that arouses reactions, almost certainly of fear, that can be plotted
—to the face by MRI, to the arms by TMS. I and a number of colleagues in New York
have recently been measuring motor-evoked potentials in muscular responses to the
sight of particular gestures often found in artworks, such as the raising of a wrist; but it
is true that the very common gesture of raised arms is too complex a movement to
permit the precise location of the relevant somatopic areas on which to perform TMS;
but in principle it should be possible, even in the case of shoulder movements such as
this  one.  A  future  project  lies  precisely  in  attempting  to  establish  the  connections
between motor responses in the premotor and motor cortices on the one hand, and
limbic responses on the other.
24 To be aware of automatic intuitive responses to an image such as this is to become even
more conscious of the artist’s conscious and unconscious uses of devices and strategies
to engage such responses; and our awareness of these devices may well play into our
esthetic understanding of this image and the satisfactions—as well as the terrors—it
offers. The same for the Gope mask, or more extravagant versions of the gesture such
as, say, Caravaggio’s great Entombment of Christ. It is in the light of the artist’s effective
use of such gestures—whether that effectiveness is conscious or unconscious is
irrelevant  here—that  one  can  then  begin  to  pursue  the  emotional  and  esthetic
implications of the variations of such Pathosformeln, from the ones we have just seen
through the  sad  photo  of  mourning  women in  Bosnia,  the  opening  page  of  Goya’s
Disasters, and the despair of Jeff Wall’s Sudden Gust of Wind to the grand gestures of
mourning the dead body of Christ which we know from the whole history of Western
art, such as Giotto’s great Lamentation in the Arena Chapel, and Rosso’s unforgettably
dramatic painting in the Louvre. 
25 The  effectiveness  of  gestures  depends  on  the  human  ability  to  understand  them
intuitively  and  motorically,  through  our  motor  system,  even  before  such  intuitive
understanding—it would actually be better to say such intuitive grasp—may or may not
be modulated by cultural knowledge. Some gestures seem to be immediately capable of
our grasp—particularly the wiping of the eyes, for example, the wiping away of tears,
and in general any clasping of the cheek in sadness, resignation, repose, or tenderness.
26 I  know  that  moving  around  across  the  history  of  art  will  exasperate  the  high
contextualists amongst you; but I am not pleading, as I have sometimes been accused
of, for ignoring contextual factors. I am suggesting that we look carefully at the ways in
which  context  modulates  automaticity,  at  top-down  modulation  of  bottom-up
responses,  at  the role  of  the prefrontal  cortex in  modulating limbic  and emotional
responses in the derivation of esthetic pleasure. 
27 The kinds of research I have been describing in this paper suggest that if there is one
term in the history of art that needs reconceiving, it is that of imitation. For what is at
stake is not just the representational mimesis of the world out there, or of other art
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works,  but  rather the  inward  imitation  of  perceived  bodily  movement;  not  actual
mimicry, rather a felt sense of imitation that is predicated on what Damasio called the
“as-if body-loop,” in other words, the activation of the very same somatotopic regions
of the brain that would be activated if we were engaged in the same actions, gestures,
and situations ourselves. Much research has obviously been done in this area by the
mirror neuron group, but valuable work has also come from Julie Grezes (working with
scientists  such  as  Jean  Decety,  Richard  Passingham,  and  Chris  Frith)  on  the  brain
mechanisms underlying the ways in which we infer deceit in the actions of others, and
how,  through  a  combination  of  both  emotional  inferral  and  simulated  action  of
observed others we may tell in which way their expectations may be thwarted. Grezes
and her colleagues were specifically interested in such judgments of living actors; we
may assume that the same also applies to judgments about the emotional  states of
those we see represented in art works; and once more it will be the skill of the artist
that is decisive in successfully conveying the evidence for the emotions associated with
such mental states as deceit and thwarted expectation. 
28 I have been describing a variety of direct forms of bodily understanding that enable
beholders to grasp the emotional states of others, or that give us the possibilities for
the interpretation of such states.  It  is precisely these basic forms of understanding,
knowable only via the community of our bodily mechanisms with those of others that
take such interpretation beyond the level of guesswork; and it is also the factor that
makes us aware not just of the expertise and skills of others—particularly relevant in
the case of all forms of art that are predicated on skill and expertise—but also of the
potential of our bodily capacities, a potential that, as Berenson believed, could also be
“life-enhancing,” to use the phrase that once sounded sentimental but now has sense as
well as sentiment. It is not surprising that C. L. R. James, in his panegyric on cricket,
should have cited Berenson’s memorable passages on Uccello’s wrestlers.
29 This  newly  understood  mode  of  imitation  thus  enables  our  understanding  of  the
motoric bases of the work and skills of others. When we look at work of art, the body of
the artisan  (to  use  the  title  of  Pamela  Smith’s  fine  book  on  the  subject)  is  always
present in the work itself. We as spectators always have available to us one form or
another of body knowledge of the work in the work of art—. We spectators also activate
whatever motor skills we may have in order to grasp the subtleties of the work, just as
certain subtleties—and this appears radically in the case of our perception of dance—
may escape us,  because without the dancer’s  training or skills,  we cannot have the
same body knowledge of what the execution of particular movements entails. It is in
the  domain  of  expertise  that  cultural  factors  enter  into  the  evaluation  of  body
knowledge, even though in many cases we may have a sense of the skills implicit in
movement without actually knowing exactly how these are carried out; and it may be,
as I’ve just suggested, that it is in the very improbability of what we see executed, the
very fact that those motor skills somehow transcend description, that we assess the
aesthetic status of the work. 
30 Moreover, it has now been proven that we not only respond to the actual movements
shown in the work, but also to the implicit movements involved in the actual execution
of the work, in the brushstrokes and chiselmarks themselves. From Willem de Kooning
to Pollock’s powerfully dynamic drips to the slashes of Lucio Fontana, we may now test
motoric responses to the actual traces of the artists movement in her works (just as
Merleau-Ponty occasionally suggested but could never prove). Two examples show just
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how clearly this is works: take, for example, the recent work of Qui Zhije where body
seems to emulate the implicit movement behind the calligraphy, even in this photo,
even before we learn that these are letters that are produced in the air by the artist
moving his arm in these forms with the aid of a torch; or even before we see the studio
photograph of  Fontana  punching holes  in his  canvas.  The  action here  is  vivid  and
striking. In this case we may or may not have a sense of the physical action required to
produce works such as the punched varieties of his Concetti Spaziali: but once we have
seen the photograph, it becomes impossible ever again to look at one of these Fontanas
without an awareness of the action of the work involved in producing them. In this
example,  too,  we  may  perhaps  begin  to  see  the  glimmerings  of  the  therapeutic
possibilities of the recuperation of movement through vision; but this is yet another
story. 
31 Even in the representation of an apparently static limb, one has a sense of physical
engagement with the work, a sense of the potential activation of the limb or limbs
involved in movement. Indeed, this applies even to the traces, the very track of a limb,
as suggested quite precisely by the Piercean notion of the trace. I think, for example, of
the case of the Buddha’s feet,  a long tradition that begins at the very beginning of
Buddhism, and is to be found, still, in the work of the contemporary Tibetan artist Ang
Sang . It may seem absurd to claim that neurons in the motor cortex are activated when
we look at the image of the feet of the Buddha (as opposed, say, to those whirling,
wheel-like hands).  The phenomenologists may not be entirely surprised; but we are
now in a position to move beyond phenomenological speculation and test this kind of
engagement with a work with precision. The lesson from such an image is surely that
the energy of a work (and its rhetorical enargeia too), need not necessarily depend on
figuration, as the early aniconists knew. The body can be present in its traces and even
in its absence. The Buddhapada depends precisely on this knowledge of the movement
of life implicit in the representation of the flat soles of the feet. 
32 And so to dance, to feet explicitly in movement. Much work has been done in recent
years  on  negative  emotions,  particularly  fear.  I  myself  have  commented  on  the
relationship between movement and fear (we see someone running away in fear, and
we ourselves feel a sense of locomotion and fear); but little work has been done on
positive emotions generally, and of the positive feelings that may ensue from the sight
of  movement  in  particular—and  of  dance  especially.  We’ve  already  looked  at
photographs  of  soccer  players  in  action;  but  surely  the  most  obvious  instance  of
pleasure in sight of movement occurs in the case of dance. Most of us are familiar with
the  emulative  sensations  of  movement  that  arise  in  the  case  of  real  dance,  of
represented dance, and even, significantly enough, of the abstract suggestion of dance
movement,  as,  for  example  (to  take  only  instance)  with  David  Smith’s  marvelous
Personage—head  thrown  back,  arm  raised  in  elegant  grace,  and  so  on.  For  years
experiments have been conducted on the emotional correlates of light-point indicators
of movement, that is of what can only be regarded as schematic representations of
body  movements,  to  examine  the  ways  in  which  such  movements,  even  in  these
rudimentary forms, are invested with emotion (and to assess the degree to which the
emotional  reactions  of  the  spectator  overlaps  with  the  emotional  impressions  the
dancer or actor may wish to convey).  I  have long been pressing my neuroscientific
colleagues to devise experiments by which to plot the relationship between emotional
and somatopic responses to images such as these; and to see whether the undoubted
pleasures  of  watching  certain  movements  have  not  only  to  do  with  the  sense  of
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liberation from the force of gravity which they seem to generate, but also with the
evocation of the potential of our bodies for such movements. This, of course, is what C.
L. R. James claimed for cricket, when he compared Walcott executing a stroke of the
backfoot  with  the  Apollo  Belvedere;  and  what  Berenson  claimed  for  Pollaiuolo’s
sculpture of two wrestling figures.
33 It is this form of activation of muscular sensitivity, of bodily potential and suppressed
potential, that we are also apt to discover in responses to works, say, such as Andries
Botha’s, as well as to a variety of Japanese dance forms—take this Butoh performance,
for  example.  On  the  one  hand  we  have  no  experience  of  all  the  complexities  of
movement and expression here, of their rule-boundedness and the training involved in
learning the rules and practices; but we do know, we can feel in our bones, not just the
movements implicit in our own bodies as we observe those of the dancers, including
the gestures of their hands, but also some sense of imitative buccal activation as we
observe those open mouths. Such expressions and the possibility of responses to them
take us back to the cradle, as shown in the remarkable work of Meltzoff and Moore of
buccal imitation in neonates. 
34 But still the question of the emotional content of such expressions remains, as well as
the equally critical one about prefrontal evaluation and modulation of intuitive and
automatic responses. Once again, it is Antonio Damasio and his colleagues above all
who have devoted considerable attention to the ways in which emotions are processed
and evaluated in the orbitofrontal cortex. The further question, of course, is the degree
to which the kinds of precognitive imitative processes I have been describing in the
case of motor simulation are modulated by top-down processing, by cultural factors.
This  is  where the cognitive processing of  automatic  responses to  gestures  becomes
critical, and offers the possibilities for the interpretation of particular gestures—but by
no  means  all  of  them.  I  say  “by  no  means  all  of  them”  because  one  of  the  most
important  and  interesting  aspects  of  the  cognitive  and  anthropological  study  of
gestures in art is  precisely that some seem to transcend cultural modulation, while
others seem all too susceptible too it; this is yet another potential area of study in a
field which, as I hope to have shown today, opens up so many rich possibilities. Even
admitting this bipolarity of gestural and emotional capacity, it is impossible to avoid
the initial sense of imitative, corporeal response when we look, for example, at Jeff
Wall’s marvelous Sudden Gust of Wind, and find that our bodies seem to twist and turn in
what seems to be exactly the way the way the central figure does. But what is perhaps
most telling, is that we find ourselves in almost complete physical sintonia with the
great curve of the tree, just as we might even with a twisted Romanesque column. Here
one begins to realize some of the further implications of—or perhaps I should say some
of the as yet unexamined elements in—our habitual investment of the inanimate with
the  animate.  At  the  basis  of  this  psychic  and  physiological  event  lie  our  motor
responses to what we observe, even to static images. It is only once we begin to grasp
how all this happens, how we stop ourselves from engaging with the implied bodies of
others,  as  well  as  our  willingness  not  to  stop  ourselves,  once  we  understand  the
activation of inhibitory processes and the deactivation of such processes, that we may
begin to have some sense of the mysteries of art. 
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NOTES
1.  “It is through the study of emotion that anthropology may best be fully “re-embodied.” Lyon
1995, 256.
2.  “A model of the emotions that takes their complexity as everyday concepts seriously would
see  them  as experiences  that  we  recognize  as  involving  both  cultural  meaning  and  bodily
feeling.” Leavitt 1996, 531. 
3.  This is consistent with the findings by Cela Conde et al that trained dancers are more inclined
to have imitative muscular responses to movements which they have learned than non-dancers;
my claim goes further than theirs in suggesting that there is a degree of felt imitative response
even  in  the  case  of  non-trained  dancers,  and  that  such  responses  have  both  esthetic  and
therapeutic implications. 
RÉSUMÉS
The relationship between vision and embodiment has still not been adequately discussed. Even
less attention has been paid to the anthropological and art historical significance of embodied
responses  to  movement,  and  the  implications  for  the  understanding  of  both  imitation  and
emotion.  In  this  paper  I  suggest  that  we  should  be  less  sceptical  about  the  differences  in
epistemological regimes between science and art, and pay more attention to the neural bases of
simulation, embodiment and emotion. I will point to some of the parallels between responses to
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